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Where Is the Quality in the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986?
Thaddeus J. Nodzenski*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Patrick v. Burget,I the United States Supreme Court cleared
the way for Dr. Timothy Patrick to recover a judgment of nearly
two million dollars from several physicians in Oregon who used
the intrahospital physician peer review 2 process in violation of fed* Associate, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago; B.A., 1979, University of Chicago; J.D., 1982, Illinois Institute of Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
2. Physician peer review, as it is generally understood in the hospital industry, is the
intrahospital process under which medical staff members review the clinical competence
of a fellow physician. The process is triggered in three instances: (1) consideration of
candidates for initial appointment to a hospital's medical staff, (2) consideration of incumbent staff members for reappointment, and (3) consideration of corrective action
against an incumbent during the term of his appointment to the staff.
The term "professional review action" means an action or recommendation
of a professional review body which is taken or made in the conduct of professional review activity, which is based on the competence or professional conduct of an individual physician (which conduct affects or could affect adversely
the health or welfare of a patient or patients), and which affects (or may affect)
adversely the clinical privileges, or membership in a professional society, of the
physician. Such term includes a formal decision of a professional review body
not to take an action or make a recommendation described in the previous sentence and also includes professional review activities relating to a professional
review action. In this chapter, an action is not considered to be based on the
competence or professional conduct of a physician if the action is primarily
based on(A) the physician's association, or lack of association, with a professional
society or association,
(B) the physician's fees or the physician's advertising or engaging in other
competitive acts intended to solicit or retain business,
(C) the physician's participation in prepaid group health plans, salaried employment, or any other manner of delivering health services whether on a feefor-service or other basis,
(D) a physician's association with, supervision of, delegation of authority to,
support for, training of, or participation in a private group practice with, a
member or members of a particular class of health care practitioner or professional, or
(E) any other matter that does not relate to the competence or professional
conduct of a physician.
42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (1988).
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eral antitrust laws. 3 In doing so, the Court rejected the defendants'
argument "that any threat of antitrust liability will prevent physicians from participating openly and actively in peer-review proceedings."'4 This decision stunned the hospital industry. One
editorial claimed that Patrick would chill the independent judgment of physicians and impede their efforts to police themselves. 5
A more dramatic commentator stated that the Supreme Court had
dropped "the atom bomb of the antitrust laws" on peer review
bodies.6
Largely in response to the jury's verdict in Patrick, Congress
passed the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (the
"Act"). 7 The Act begins with congressional findings that medical
malpractice and poor quality medical care are nationwide
problems that cannot be solved by the individual states.' Congress
The term "professional review activity" means an activity of a health care
entity with respect to an individual physician(A) to determine whether the physician may have clinical privileges with respect to, or membership in, the entity,
(B) to determine the scope or conditions of such privileges or membership,
or
(C) to change or modify such privileges or membership.
Id. § 11151(10).
The terms "peer review," "professional review," and "professional review action" are
synonymous and are used interchangeably throughout this article.
3. More specifically, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the reviewing
physicians' conduct was immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine.
Patrick,486 U.S. at 105-06. The Court ruled that the State of Oregon was not sufficiently
involved in the peer review process to constitute "active state supervision," one of the two
elements of the state action immunity test. Id. at 105. Because the case did not satisfy
this element, the Court concluded its analysis without considering the other prong of the
test: whether "'the challenged restraint [has been] "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy.. ...Id. at 100 (quoting California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.))).
4. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
5. Gainer & Miles, The Impact of Patrick v. Burget on Peer Review, 2 MED. STAFF
COUNS. 13 (1988) (citing Court Ruling Will Undercut Peer Review, HEALTH WEEK, June
6, 1988, at 24).
6. Doctors Can Sue in Peer Reviews, JusticesDeclare, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1988, at 1;
see also Gainer and Miles, supra note 5, at 13.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 11101-11152 (1988). Congressmen from the states comprising the
area governed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which heard
the Patrick appeal, were instrumental in the passage of the Act. See Note, Physician
Staff Privilege Cases: Antitrust Liability and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act,
29 WM.& MARY L. REv. 609, 625 n.83 (1988).
8. Specifically, Congress found: "The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice
and the need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems
that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State."
42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (1988). The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Health and Human Services recently conducted a study of state medical licensing boards.
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found that there is an overriding national need for effective peer
review.9 It apparently believed that physician peer review before
the passage of the Act was "ineffective" because the threat of liability for damages resulting from a physician's participation in peer
review discouraged participation, as evidenced by the outcry over
Patrick.'0 Thus, the Act creates a "safe harbor" designed to protect peer review participants from liability for damages in certain
cases." By removing this threat of liability, Congress hoped that
physicians would be more willing to identify incompetent or unprofessional physicians through the peer review process.
This Article analyzes the impact of the Act on the current peer
review process and suggests an alternative approach to evaluating
the quality of a physician's professional services. The fundamental
problem with peer review today is that the process asks physicians
to criticize their colleagues. This problem is especially acute when
the reviewers work closely or compete with the physician under
review. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that physicians are reluctant to engage in effective peer review.
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR

GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
CAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW (1986).

& HUMAN SERVS., MEDIThis study demonstrated
that since the establishment of the Medicare program, states have been unable to identify
and eliminate incompetent physicians. See Kusserow, Handley & Yessian, An Overview
of State Medical Discipline, 257 J. A.M.A. 820 (1987). The study concluded that
although physician incompetence is a major problem, only a small number of state disciplinary proceedings address it. Id at 822-23.
9. "There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review." 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5) (1988).
10. "The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including
treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians
from participating in effective professional peer review." Id. § 11101(4).
11. The Act provides:
If a professional review action.., of a professional review body meets all the
standards specified in Section 11112(a) of this title, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section:
(A) the professional review body,
(B) any person acting as a member or staff to the body,
(C) any person under a contract or other formal agreement with the body,
and
(D) any person who participates with or assists the body with respect to the
action, shall not be liable in damages under any law of the United States or of
any State (or political subdivision thereof) with respect to the action. The preceding sentence shall not apply to damages under any law of the United States
or any State relating to the civil rights of any person or persons, including the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. and the Civil Rights Acts, 42
U.S.C. 1981, et seq. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the United States
or any Attorney General of a State from bringing an action, including an action
under Section 15c of title 15, where such an action is otherwise authorized.
Id. § lllll(a)(1).
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The Act, if amended, can help to overcome some physician reluctance in two respects. First, the Act should be revised to create
an incentive for hospitals and their physicians to rely on outside
medical experts to perform the substantive clinical review of physicians under scrutiny. Second, Congress should bolster the protection of the Act by immunizing hospitals and their reviewers against
all claims, except those instances in which outside review was used
as a pretext to keep a physician off the hospital's medical staff.
This Article first describes the health industry dynamics that led
to the passage of the Act and discusses the Act's provisions and
inadequacies. Next, it describes the legal infrastructure of peer review and identifies the major obstacles to this process. Finally, the
Article offers some suggestions for improving the Act.
II.

THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF THE HEALTH CARE
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1986

Congress passed the Act to calm the fear that federal antitrust
exposure for peer review participants would deter their participation in the process. This concern became more profound in light of
the damages awarded in Patrick. A review of the Patrick litigation
and the specific provisions of the Act shows that Congress was not
interested in protecting the type of "peer review" found in Patrick.
Instead, the Act was designed to teach hospitals and reviewers how
to conduct peer review to avoid exposure under various laws. Nevertheless, the protections of the Act are illusory and its current
provisions should not quell the fears generated by Patrick.
A.

Patrick v. Burget

-

The Impetus for the Act

Patrick v. Burget 2 is perhaps the most famous medical staff dispute to date. In Patrick, the members of a private, group medical
practice, the Astoria Clinic, consistently refused to deal professionally with Dr. Patrick, a general and vascular surgeon, after he rejected a partnership in the clinic and began an independent
competing practice. 13 Even when the clinic had no general surgeon
on its staff, the clinic's physicians refused to make referrals to Dr.
Patrick.14 The clinic's physicians also were reluctant to assist Dr.
Patrick with his own patients, and repeatedly criticized him for
failing to obtain outside consultations and adequate backup
12.
13.
14.

486 U.S. 94 (1986).
Id. at 96.
Id.
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coverage. ' 5
Subsequently, a clinic surgeon asked the executive committee of
the medical staff of Columbia Memorial Hospital, the only hospital
in town, to review Dr. Patrick's competence.' 6 A majority of the
hospital's medical staff were employees or partners of the clinic. 7
In the peer review proceedings, physicians from the clinic reviewed
Dr. Patrick's cases, which they discussed more often and criticized
more thoroughly than those of other surgeons.1 8 The executive
committee of the medical staff voted to recommend terminating
Dr. Patrick's privileges because it found that his patient care services fell below the hospital's standards. 9
The hospital provided Dr. Patrick with a hearing before a fivemember committee chaired by a partner of the clinic, who two
years earlier had complained about Dr. Patrick to the hospital's
executive committee. 20 Nine cases out of the 2000 to 2500 surgeries performed by Dr. Patrick ultimately comprised the evidence
against him, and experts later disagreed as to the quality of Dr.
Patrick's performance in these cases. 21
At the peer review hearing, the committee members were inattentive during Dr. Patrick's presentation of his position.22 They
also refused to answer questions from Dr. Patrick's attorney regarding their personal knowledge of the evidence and their personal biases against Dr. Patrick. 23 Before the completion of these
proceedings, Dr. Patrick resigned from the staff and filed a federal
antitrust lawsuit against the hospital and the partners of the
clinic.24

Dr. Patrick prevailed in a jury trial and was awarded a judgment
of nearly two million dollars against the clinic. 5 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the peer review process, even
15. Id.
16. Id. at 97.
17. Id. at 96.
18. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1503-04 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 486 U.S. 94 (1986).
19. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 97.
20. Id. The complaint was based upon Dr. Patrick's delegation of care to an experienced associate, who allegedly left the patient unattended. The executive committee referred the complaint to the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners, which issued a letter of
reprimand. This letter was withdrawn when Dr. Patrick sought judicial review of the
Board's action. Id. at 96-97.
21. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1504.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 97.
25. Id. at 98. The jury awarded Patrick $650,000 in damages for his two Sherman
Act claims, and the district court trebled the damages as required by law. Id.
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if tainted, is immune under the state action doctrine from antitrust
scrutiny. 26 The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and reinstated
the district court's award of damages."
Patrick is the archetypal example of the misuse and abuse of the
peer review process. This abuse may not be typical or pervasive;
however, when physicians exert their power in purely anticompetitive ways under the guise of peer review, antitrust liability may be
warranted.
Although the verdict in Patrick inspired the passage of the Act,
this statute would not have immunized any of the defendants
found liable in the Patrick case. Thus, the Act was not designed to
protect the tainted peer review process employed in Patrick. Instead, the Act's purpose was to establish some parameters for conducting peer review without the threat of liability for damages.
B.

Peer Review and Litigation Avoidance

The potential for litigation poses a primary disincentive for physician participation in peer review. Physicians are reluctant to participate in peer review because they wish to avoid involvement in
retaliatory lawsuits brought by disgruntled physicians who sue the
hospital and all other responsible parties for denial of their hospital
membership or privileges. 28 A peer review action adverse to a physician generally gives rise to at least five causes of action: (1) defamation, (2) tortious interference with advantageous business
relationships, (3) intentional infliction of mental distress, (4)
breach of contract, and (5) violation of federal and state antitrust
laws.29
This litigation can be quite costly even when parties settle out of
court. For example, in Weiss v. York Hospital,30 the court found
the medical staff of the hospital liable for antitrust violations to Dr.
Weiss and other osteopaths. Four of the peer reviewers also were
26. Patrick, 800 F.2d at 1509.
27. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105-06. Specifically, the Court recognized that the Act did
not apply retroactively to the circumstances in Patrick. Id. at 105 n.8. Prior to the effective date of the Act, only state action could immunize peer review activities from antitrust liability. At the time of the Patrick case, Oregon did not provide such immunity.
Id. at 105-06.
28. Curran, Legal Immunity for Medical Peer-Review Programs: New Policies Explored, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 233 (1989).
29. Chayet & Reardon, Trouble in the Medical Staff: A PracticalGuide to Hospital
Initiated Quality Assurance, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 312-14 (1981).
30. 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
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held liable for interfering with Dr. Weiss's business relations.3 I
Shortly before the trial for damages, the defendants agreed to pay
more than four million dollars to settle the case. 32 Similarly, Dennis L. Brooks, an ophthalmologist, sued the San Diego Academy of
Ophthalmology, after the Academy criticized him for delegating
follow-up care for cataract patients to other ophthalmologists.33
This criticism caused hospitals to curtail Dr. Brooks's privileges.34
Dr. Brooks brought an antitrust suit against the Academy and
three of its officers. 35 During the litigation, the parties deposed
more than 120 people, legal fees exceeded one million dollars, and
the Academy went bankrupt.36 The three individual defendants
paid Dr. Brooks $400,000 to settle the case, and several members
of the Academy each paid approximately $30,000, resulting in a
total settlement amount between two and three million dollars.37
1. State Law Immunity
Although most states have enacted statutory protection for peer
review participants, 38 these statutes generally have failed to allay
physicians' fear of potential litigation. The immunity provided by
these statutes ranges from qualified immunity in defamation actions to absolute immunity in all civil litigation. 39 This protection,
however, generally depends upon the peer review action being
taken in good faith' or reasonably.4 Thus, a complaint alleging
31. Holoweiko, How to Stop a Wayward Doctor Without Getting Burned, MED.
ECON., Nov. 20, 1989, at 184, 187.
32. Id
33. Id. at 191.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-502 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36.5-105
(1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-19a(b)-(c) (West 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111
1/2, para. 151.2 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1-6.5 (West Supp. 1990); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1287 (West 1988); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-601(f) (Supp.
1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.25 (Anderson Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
76, §§ 25-28 (West Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.3 (Purdon Supp. 1990);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-1.5 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-4-25 (1986); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 63-6-219 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-25-1 (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1442 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.240 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-2 (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.37 (West 1989).
39. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-502 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36.5-105
(1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-19a(b)-(c) (West 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. III
1/2, para. 151.2 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1-6.5 (West Supp. 1990).
40. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.240(2) (1988).
41. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1287 (West 1988).
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bad faith or unreasonable or malicious use of peer review will require physicians named as defendants to remain in the lawsuit until
the issues regarding the application of immunity are resolved in
their favor. Even if the peer reviewers ultimately succeed, the costs
of defending such lawsuits may be prohibitive.42
Congress was aware that most review actions already were protected by state law immunity and confidentiality provisions.4 3 It
apparently believed that these protections adequately served the interests of peer review and quality assurance at the state level, but
that a small number of federal antitrust actions had overridden
these protections. 44 For reasons not contained in the Act or its
legislative history, Congress believed that peer review in the United
States had deteriorated because of the threat of potential federal
antitrust liability for the participants.4 5 Congress failed to explore
whether, or why, peer review was ineffective at the state level despite the presence of state statutory protections for peer review
participants.
2.

Immunity Under the Act

Congress recognized that litigation avoidance is a strong force in
the hospital industry, particularly in the context of discipline for
incompetent physicians. 46 Prior to the passage of the Act, hospitals often accepted a physician's "voluntary" resignations in return
for the hospital's silence about the reasons for the resignation.47
Hospitals made these agreements to avoid costly, lengthy, and unpredictable litigation. 48 The threat of litigation also strongly affected the physicians who conducted peer review.49
The Act sets out a four-part immunity test for determining
whether a particular peer review action is protected.5" The peer
42. Even if these costs are covered by the hospital's commercial or self-insurance
policy, the negative economic impact is not eliminated. Insurance premiums tend to increase as claims increase. Moreover, the coverage limits of a policy may be unclear at the
outset of a peer review action because of the uncertain nature of potential litigation.
43. H.R. REP. No. 99-903, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6384, 6391 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 6385.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The federal antitrust immunity of the Act went into effect on November 14, 1986.
The Act's immunity for actions under state law went into effect on October 14, 1989, in
states that did not otherwise opt in or out of the protection of the Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11111(c) (1988).
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review action must be conducted:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was taken in the furtherance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures have been afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures
as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the
facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after
meeting the requirement of (3) above.'
51. Id. § 11112(a). The statute provides:
(a) In general
For purposes of the protection set forth in section 11111(a) of this title, a
professional review action must be taken(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician
under the circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts
known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the
requirement of paragraph (3).
A professional review action shall be presumed to have met the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in section 11111 (a) of this title unless
the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.
(b) Adequate notice and hearing
A health care entity is deemed to have met the adequate notice and hearing
requirement of subsection (a)(3) of this section with respect to a physician if the
following conditions are met (or are waived voluntarily by the physician):
(1) Notice of proposed action
The physician has been given notice stating(A) (i) that a professional review action has been proposed to be
taken against the physician,
(ii) reasons for the proposed action,
(B) (i) that the physician has the right to request a hearing on the
proposed action,
(ii) any time limit (of not less than 30 days) within which to request such a hearing, and
(C) a summary of the rights in the hearing under paragraph (3).
(2) Notice of hearing
If a hearing is requested on a timely basis under paragraph (1)(B), the physician involved must be given notice stating:
(A) the place, time, and date, of the hearing, which date shall not be less
than 30 days after the date of the notice, and
(B) a list of the witnesses (if any) expected to testify at the hearing on
behalf of the professional review body.
(3) Conduct of hearing and notice
If a hearing is requested on a timely basis under paragraph (I)(B)(A) subject to subparagraph (B), the hearing shall be held (as determined
by the health care entity)--
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The plaintiff-physician has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any of these standards has not been
52
satisfied.
The Act also provides adequate notice and fair hearing procedures to satisfy the third part of the Act's immunity test. The adequate notice element is satisfied if the physician is given notice:
(1) that a peer review action has been proposed against the
physician,
(2) of the reasons for the proposed action,
(3) that the physician has the right to request a hearing on the
proposed action within a specified time limit,
(4) of a summary of the physician's hearing rights as described in
the Act,
(5) of the time, place, and date of the hearing within thirty days,
if a hearing is requested, and
(6) of a list of witnesses expected to testify at the hearing on behalf of the peer review body."
A hearing is deemed fair under the Act if:
(i) before an arbitrator mutually acceptable to the physician and the
health care entity,
(ii) before a hearing officer who is appointed by the entity and who is
not in direct economic competition with the physician involved, or
(iii) before a panel of individuals who are appointed by the entity and
are not in direct economic competition with the physician involved;
(B) the right to the hearing may be forfeited if the physician fails, without
good cause, to appear;
(C) in the hearing the physician involved has the right(i) to representation by an attorney or other person of the physician's
choice,
(ii) to have a record made of the proceedings, copies of which may be
obtained by the physician upon payment of any reasonable charges
associated with the preparation thereof,
(iii) to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses,
(iv) to present evidence determined to be relevant by the hearing officer, regardless of its admissibility in a court of law, and
(v) to submit a written statement at the close of the hearing; and
(D) upon completion of the hearing, the physician involved has the
right(i) to receive the written recommendation of the arbitrator, officer, or
panel, including a statement of the basis for the recommendations,
and
(ii) to receive a written decision of the health care entity, including a
statement of the basis for the decision.
A professional review body's failure to meet the conditions described in this
subsection shall not, in itself, constitute failure to meet the standards of subsection (a)(3) of this section.
Id. § 11112(a)-(b).
52. Id. § 11112(a).
53. Id. § 11112(b)(l)-(2).
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(1) it is held before an arbitrator acceptable to both parties, or a
hearing officer, or panel of individuals not in economic competition with the physician; and
(2) the physician is afforded the right to: (i) be represented by an
attorney; (ii) have the hearing recorded; (iii) call, examine, and
cross-examine witnesses; (iv) present relevant evidence; (v) submit a written statement; (vi) receive the written recommendation
and analysis of the arbitrator, officer, or panel; and (vii) receive
from the hospital a written notice of the decision and its basis.'
If a peer review procedure meets the four-part immunity test of
the Act, the hospital and its peer review participants will not be
liable for damages as a result of the peer review process, unless the
claim involves certain federal civil rights violations." The Federal
and state governments are not precluded from bringing actions
challenging the review process.56 Compliance with the Act does
from lawnot immunize the hospital or its peer review participants
57
suits seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.
The Act's protection is limited to peer review decisions based
upon the physician's clinical competence or quality of care. 58 A
decision to reject an applicant for appointment or reappointment
based upon nonclinical factors, such as the applicant's failure to
maintain certain minimum levels of malpractice insurance or the
inability of the hospital to accommodate the applicant's expertise
(e.g., when patient volume for certain services is too low to justify
the addition of physicians providing these services or when the
hospital decides to discontinue a service such as its open-heart program because of low volume), is not protected.59
54.

Id. § 11112(b)(3).

55.

Id. § 11111(a)(1).

56. Id.
57. Id. The clear terms of the Act show that it provides immunity only against actions for damages. Id.
58. Id.§ 11112.
59. Hospitals often deny physicians access to their facilities for reasons not related
directly to the physicians' clinical abilities. See, e.g., Pollock v. Methodist Hosp., 392 F.
Supp. 393 (E.D. La. 1975) (lack of malpractice insurance coverage); Yeargin v. Hamilton
Memorial Hosp., 229 Ga. 870, 195 S.E.2d 8 (1972) (failure to provide emergency room
coverage); Szczerbaniuk v. Memorial Hosp., 180 Ill. App. 3d 706, 536 N.E.2d 138 (1989)
(sexual harassment); Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 125 II. App. 3d 244, 465
N.E.2d 554 (1984) (overutilization of hospital facilities); Koelling v. Board of Trustees of
Mary Frances Skiff Memorial Hosp., 259 Iowa 1185, 146 N.W.2d 284 (1967) (medical
records violations); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d
589 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971) (inability to work with others); Guerrero v.
Burlington County Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 360 A.2d 334 (1976) (overcrowded
facility). Because these decisions do not relate directly to the clinical abilities of the physician denied access to the hospital, input from the medical staff is unnecessary. The
board and administration should be able to make these managerial decisions without
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Instead, the Act protects only peer review actions that find a
physician clinically incompetent or dangerous if the actions are reported to the federal government for the purpose of putting all hospitals in the United States on notice of the action. 6° The physician
whom the report will stigmatize has every incentive to file a lawsuit
against the hospital and the peer review participants for injunctive
relief to clear his or her name. The Act does nothing to protect
hospitals or peer review participants from such lawsuits.
triggering the peer review process. See Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 49
Md. App. 362, 432 A.2d 483 (1981), wherein the court stated, "The requirement that the
Hospital hold a hearing on what is essentially a management decision vested in the several governing boards of the private hospital was not contemplated by the charter and
bylaws of the Hospital." Id. at 373, 432 A.2d at 489; see also Engelstad v. Virginia Mun.
Hosp., 718 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1983) (hospital may terminate a department head, due to
conflicting ideas about how the department should operate, without triggering the peer
review process). Although these decisions are not protected by the Act, a hospital's unilateral decision to deny appointment or reappointment or to remove a physician for
nonclinical reasons generally does not need special protection from the antitrust laws.
Absent involvement from competing physicians, the likelihood of expensive antitrust litigation over these matters is reduced. Moreover, absolutely immunizing the nonclinical
decisions of hospitals will do nothing to promote effective peer review. See Szczerbaniuk,
180 Il. App. 3d at 710-11, 536 N.E.2d at 141 (actions of hospital administrators involving removal of a physician outside of the peer review process were not protected by the
state peer review immunity statute). Therefore, the Act should not be expanded to immunize these actions from all lawsuits that a disgruntled physician might bring.
60. Specifically, the Act provides:
(a) Reporting by health care entities
(1) On physicians
Each health care entity which(A) takes a professional review action that adversely affects the
clinical privileges of a physician for a period longer than 30 days;
(B) accepts the surrender of clinical privileges of a physician(i) while the physician is under an investigation by the entity relating to possible incompetence or improper professional conduct,
or
(ii) in return for not conducting such an investigation or proceeding; or
(C) in the case of such an entity which is a professional society, takes
a professional review action which adversely affects the membership of
a physician in the society,
shall report to the Board of Medical Examiners, in accordance with section 11134(a) of this title, the information described in paragraph (3) .....
(b) Reporting by Board of Medical Examiners
Each Board of Medical Examiners shall report, in accordance with Section
11134 of this title, the information reported to it under subsection (a) of this
section and known instances of a health care entity's failure to report information under subsection (a)(l) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1), (b) (1988).
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3.

The Illusory Protection of the Act

Because the Act protects only certain types of reasonable conduct, federal antitrust actions for damages may proceed at least to
the discovery stage of litigation if the disgruntled physician alleges
that the peer review action was taken: (1) in the unreasonablebelief that it furthered quality health care, (2) after an unreasonable
effort to obtain the facts of the matter, (3) with inadequate notice
and hearing procedures that were unfair to the physician, and (4)
in the unreasonable belief that the action was warranted by the
facts known following unreasonable efforts to obtain the facts. Indeed, alleging and proving any one of these facts by a preponderance of the evidence may defeat the immunity of the Act.6 A
complaint challenging peer review action that fails to allege at least
one, if not all four, of these facts is virtually inconceivable.
Consequently, a court could reject a well-drafted complaint for
damages, at the earliest, after the filing of a motion for summary
judgment based upon the Act's immunity. This motion would be
successful only after all parties in the case had an opportunity to
conduct expensive and time-consuming discovery. Discovery
could include document requests, interrogatories, and depositions
of hospital personnel and peer review participants. The issues regarding the four-part immunity test of the Act also would have to
be briefed fully and argued.
A case that illustrates the above scenario is Austin v. McNamara,6 2 the first and only reported decision under the Act. In Austin, a neurosurgeon alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act 63 and brought state business tort claims against five physician
peer reviewers and a hospital. The court initially did not dismiss
the complaint, and the parties engaged in discovery that included
depositions of the individual physician-defendants." Although the
court held that the Act immunized the hospital and its peer reviewers from damages, the case proceeded to summary judgment.65
The court granted defendants' motions after the parties filed voluminous moving papers, declarations, and exhibits. The plaintiff's
failure to address, much less rebut, the defendants' evidentiary
showing made the defense's task much easier. The complaining
neurosurgeon failed to mention the Act in his response despite the
61. Id. § I1l12(a).
62. 731 F. Supp. 934 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
64. Austin, 731 F. Supp. at 935.
65. Id. at 944.
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defendants' reliance on it in their moving papers. 66 The plaintiff's
failure to establish a factual issue regarding the Act's four-part immunity test gave the court little choice but to rule in favor of the
hospital and its peer reviewers.
Although the Act prevented the case from going to trial, the
parties had to undergo discovery and engage in a burdensome
briefing process. The peer review action, which lasted over four
years,67 practically went uncontested because the plaintiff ignored
the Act in his response to the defendants' motions. Thus, even
when the circumstances heavily favor the peer reviewers, as they
did in Austin, the process can be lengthy, disruptive, and costly.
Had the neurosurgeon in Austin raised a factual issue regarding
the Act, such as the unreasonableness of the peer review participants' beliefs and actions that led to the peer review action, he
would have defeated the summary judgment motion and forced the
case to trial. Although this point was not tested in Austin, the unresolved factual issues created by the Act's immunity test could
force most cases to trial. The Act fails, therefore, to shorten significantly the litigation process or reduce its costs.
Further, the Act makes the reasonableness of the beliefs and actions of the peer review participants one of the central issues in the
proceedings.68 Under the Act, the court or the jury must decide
whether the defendants reasonably believed that they were acting:
(1) in furtherance of quality health care, (2) after a reasonable investigation of the matter, (3) after providing the physician with
adequate notice and a fair hearing, and (4) in the reasonable belief
that the rejection was warranted under the facts.69 If the defendants acted fairly and reasonably in taking the peer review action,
they are not liable under the federal antitrust laws in the first place.
Thus, the Act provides the hospitals and peer review participants
little, if any, additional protection from antitrust laws, because the
fundamental inquiry in every antitrust case is whether the challenged actions were reasonable.70 The Act fails to narrow this
inquiry.
Congress also intended courts to rule on the Act's immunity
even though a case involved other issues.71 Congress believed that
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 942.
Id. at 936.
See id. at 939-42.
Id
See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp.,,745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.

1060 (1985).
71. HOUSE

REPORT,

supra note 43, at 6394.
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the court could find a defendant immune from damages under the
Act, yet allow the plaintiff to demonstrate that the peer review action was otherwise improper.72 Thus, the case could proceed to
address whether injunctive, declaratory, or other relief would be
appropriate. 3
Assuming that a viable claim for injunctive relief remained following a favorable immunity ruling for the defendants, the plaintiff
could argue that, by virtue of the Act's immunity, he has no adequate remedy at law and he is being harmed irreparably. 74 Thus, a
favorable immunity ruling for the defendants would assist the
plaintiff in making his claim for injunctive relief and perhaps assist
in ultimately allowing the plaintiff to be placed or to remain on the
75
hospital's staff.
Consequently, the Act raises false hopes of avoiding litigation.
It will not stop the filing of lawsuits and will do very little, if anything, to terminate these lawsuits at an early stage in the litigation
process. Once physicians realize the true limitations and applications of the Act, they may well conclude that it provides no meaningful protection for participation in effective peer review. The
energy hospitals and physicians might expend in complying with
the Act, only to realize the meager protection it offers, might create
disillusionment with the Act and with the peer review process
itself.
4.

The Reporting Provisions of the Act
Under the Act, any peer review action that adversely affects the
clinical privileges of a physician for more than thirty days, or any
surrender of clinical privileges by a physician who is under investigation by the hospital for incompetence or unprofessional conduct,
or in exchange for not conducting such an investigation, is reporta72. Id.
73. Id.
74. It is difficult to conceive of a lawsuit in which injunctive relief would be appropriate if the defendants acted with the reasonable belief of furthering quality health care,
after a reasonable effort to obtain the relevant facts, following adequate notice and fair
hearing procedures, and with the reasonable belief that the action was warranted. If peer
review participants prevail on the immunity issues, the entire lawsuit should be dismissed
at the summary judgment phase.
75. See generally In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1985) (party may
not obtain injunctive relief if the claimed loss can be adequately remedied by an award of
damages); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984) (a
court may issue a preliminary injunction if the moving party can establish that: (1) he
has a chance of prevailing on the merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief; (3) the balance of hardships to the parties tips in his favor; and (4) the
injunctive relief would serve the public interest).
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ble to the federal government for inclusion in the National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and
Other Health Care Practitioners.7 6 The report must contain the
name of the physician, a description of the reasons for the peer
review action or surrender of privileges, and any other information
deemed relevant by the Secretary of Health and Human Services."
The Act then requires other hospitals to obtain this information
every time a physician applies for staff membership or clinical privileges and once every two years for incumbent staff members.7"
Additionally, hospitals have the option to request this information
at other times.7 9
76. 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (1988). On October 17, 1989, the Department of Health and
Human Services published its final regulations setting forth the criteria for reporting to
and requesting information from the National Practitioner Data Bank as mandated by
the Act. See Final Regulations for National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners, 54 Fed. Reg. 42,722 (1989)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 60); Corrections to Final Regulations on National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners, 54 Fed. Reg. 43,890 (1989). These regulations became effective on September 1,
1990, when the data bank became operational. Announcement of Opening Date of National Practitioner Data Bank, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,239 (1990). For a general discussion of
the nature of this data bank, see infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
77. Specifically, the Act provides:
The information to be reported under this subsection is(A) the name of the physician or practitioner involved,
(B) a description of the acts or omissions or other reasons
for the action or, if known, for the surrender, and
(C) such other information respecting the circumstances of the
action or surrender as the Secretary deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 11 133(a)(3) (1988).
78. The Act provides:
(a) In general
It is the duty of each hospital to request from the Secretary (or the agency
designated under Section 11134(b) of this title), on and after the date information is first required to be reported under Section 11134(a) of this title) [sic](1) at the time a physician or licensed health care practitioner applies to be
on the medical staff (courtesy or otherwise) of, or for clinical privileges at, the
hospital, information reported under this subchapter concerning the physician
or practitioner, and
(2) once every 2 years information reported under this subchapter concerning any physician or such practitioner who is on the medical staff (courtesy or
otherwise) of, or has been granted clinical privileges at, the hospital.
A hospital may request such information at other times.
(b) Failure to obtain information
With respect to a medical malpractice action, a hospital which does not request information respecting a physician or practitioner as required under subsection (a) of this section is presumed to have knowledge of any information
reported under this subchapter to the Secretary with respect to the physician or
practitioner.
Id. § 11135(a)-(b).
79. Id. § 11135(a).
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This national data bank on physicians will also contain information about allegations of the physician's medical malpractice.
Under the Act, medical malpractice payments, no matter how
small, are reportable to the federal government.80 The information
to be reported includes:
(1) the name of the physician involved,
(2) the amount of the payment,
(3) the name of the hospital with which the physician is
affiliated,
(4) a description of the acts or omissions and injuries or illnesses
upon which the action or claim was based, and
(5) any other information deemed necessary by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. 1
Although Congress understood that the relationship between poor
quality of care and a malpractice settlement may be tenuous, it
believed that hospitals authorized to obtain this data
would use it
82
responsibly to evaluate a physician's qualifications.
Thus, the Act focuses on identifying incompetent or unprofessional physicians and preventing these physicians from continuing
to injure patients.8 3 Congress realized that state licensing boards,
hospitals, and medical societies often failed to weed out incompetent or unprofessional physicians and, even if they did so, the phy80. Specifically the Act provides:
(a)In general
Each entity (including an insurance company) which makes payment under a
policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice action or
claim shall report, in accordance with Section 11134 of this title, information
respecting the payment and circumstances thereof.
(b) Information to be reported
The information to be reported under subsection (a) of this section includes(1) the name of any physician or licensed health care practitioner for
whose benefit the payment is made,
(2) the amount of the payment,
(3) the name (if known) of any hospital with which the physician or practitioner is affiliated or associated,
(4) a description of the acts or omissions and injuries or illnesses upon
which the action or claim was based, and
(5) such other information as the Secretary determines is required for appropriate interpretation of information reported under this section.
(c) Sanctions for failure to report
Any entity that fails to report information on a payment required to be reported under this section shall be subject to a civil money penalty of not more
than $10,000 for each such payment involved ....
Id. § 11131 (a)-(c).
81. Id. § 11131(b) (1988).
82. House Report, supra note 43, at 6396.
83. Id. at 6384.
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sicians were free to move from state to state without disclosing
their past practices." As discussed above, the reporting requirements of the Act will generate negative information about physicians in two contexts: medical malpractice and hospital-medical
staff relations. The data bank required by the Act, which may be
tapped by every hospital in the United States interested in a particular physician, could- stigmatize physicians tremendously.
In addition, by requiring hospitals to report a physician's staff
resignation in lieu of disciplinary action, the Act eliminates the
only avenue hospitals had to resolve a medical staff dispute without
creating a substantial risk of litigation. Health industry witnesses
informed Congress that this national reporting system would result
in an enormous increase in litigation. 85 Physicians, subject to peer
review action and faced with the certainty that they will be unable
to hide their past performance from other hospitals nationwide,
will feel compelled
to challenge the action as if their careers were
6
in jeopardy.
This discussion, however, is not a criticism of the reporting requirements. On the contrary, a national data bank that contains
accurate and reliable information about a physician's performance
will be useful in promoting quality health care. Congress, however, seemed to ignore the tremendous potential for litigation involved with such a system. Instead of dismantling the data bank,
Congress should improve the protections of the Act for reviewing
and reporting incompetent physicians.

III. THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF PEER REVIEW
Peer review owes its existence and structure to a number of historical, economic, and legal factors. Peer review places physicians
in the important role of gatekeepers who control a physician's access to valuable hospital resources that may be essential to a particular physician's ability to practice medicine; for example, hospital
privileges are essential for the practice of cardiac surgery. Physicians exercise this control by reviewing the applications of candidates for medical staff appointment and reappointment, and the
clinical data of physicians subject to corrective action due to possible incompetence. Through a complicated structure of medical
staff committees and hearings, the physician peer reviewers recommend the appropriate action that the hospital's board of directors
84.
85.

Id. at 6385.
Id.

86.

Id.
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should take regarding the physician under review. In general, hospital boards are reluctant to reject these recommendations because
they defer to the reviewing physicians' expertise in evaluating the
clinical performance and competence of other physicians. Additionally, they fear the adverse economic ramifications that may follow from an action that goes against the wishes of the hospital's
medical staff. Decisions that alienate a medical staff may cause a
hospital's staff physicians to admit their patients to other hospitals.
Thus, the existence, structure and influence of physician peer review is founded in large part upon the economic power staff physicians have over hospitals. This power has manifested itself in the
way hospital care is reimbursed and organized.
A.

The Economic Power of Physicians

The economic power of physicians is founded upon state medical
practice acts, which allow only physicians to practice medicine.8 7
This prohibition against the unlicensed practice of medicine prevents hospitals from employing physicians or otherwise controlling
their professional judgment in patient care."" Accordingly, only
physicians can order medical tests, prescribe drugs, recommend
surgery, or admit a patient to a hospital.8 9 Hospital boards and
administrators are prohibited by law from admitting patients or
providing other hospital services without the intervention and consent of a licensed physician. 9° This control over patient admissions
gives staff physicians substantial power over the financial destiny of
a hospital and, as a result, its board and management.
Because of their unique position to control the use of hospital
services, physicians historically have viewed hospitals as nothing
more than "doctors' workshops" or auxiliaries to their private office practices. 91 In 1917, a surveyor for the American College of
87. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-3 (1989) ( "[n]o person shall practice medicine ...without a valid, existing license to do so"); see also People v. United
Medical Servs., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936) (only individuals can practice
medicine); Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the
Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 464-67 (1987).
88. For a thorough critique of this doctrine, see Hall, InstitutionalControl of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriersto Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431
(1988).
89. Christoffel, Hiringon the Cheap: Health Care Costs, the Eclipse of Physiciansand
Change in Licensing Laws, 4 ST. Louis U. PuB. L.F. 57 (1984).
90. For an excellent discussion and analysis of how physicians and hospital administrators should interact with respect to patient admissions and treatment to achieve certain cost containment objectives, see Hall, supra note 88.
91.
P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 178 (1982).
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Surgeons reported that physicians viewed the hospital's role as
merely providing space with proper heat, light, and food for the
patient. 92 The courts also have supported the view that a hospital
is not much more than a specialized hotel serving the physician's
93
patients.
Today, physicians still view hospitals as their "workshops" and
admit and treat patients in hospitals essentially without interference from the board or the administration.94 Certain preadmission
utilization review requirements imposed by third-party payors, as
well as hospital bed and service capacity,9" impose the only practical obstacles to patient admissions. Although the physician participates as a medical staff member within the limits of the hospital
and medical staff bylaws, these internal controls do not authorize
the hospital administration to supervise how the physician treats
patients. 96 The medical staff, generally divided into clinical departments based upon the specialties of its member physicians (e.g.,
pediatrics, cardiology, surgery), usually plays a more direct role in
supervising its own members. 97 These departments often have the
responsibility to monitor and evaluate the professional care provided by their members. In general, however, physicians bill and
collect for their services as "individual entrepreneurs," not collectively as members of the hospital's staff or of any particular
department. 98
The hospital administration's role is to manage an institution
that makes various resources available for the physician's use.99
The administration generally provides nonphysician patient care
services (e.g., nursing and operating rooms) and institutional support services (e.g., accounting and data processing).100 The hospital receives its revenues only from patient care services it provides
to patients admitted to the hospital by individual physicians.101
Thus, the hospital and its physicians have a symbiotic economic
92. Goldberg, The Duty of HospitalMedicalStaffs to Regulate the Quality of Patient
Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 PAC. L.J. 55, 66 (1982).
93. Smith v. Duke Univ. Hosp., 219 N.C. 628, 634, 14 S.E.2d 643, 647 (1941) (hospitals provide only room and board), overruled on other grounds, Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 (1967).
94. Harris, Regulation and Internal Control in Hospitals, 55 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. OF
MED. 88, 90 (1979).
95. Id. at 93.
96. Id. at 94.
97. Id. at 90.
98. Id. at 92.
99. Id. at 92.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 93.
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relationship under which each party's activities contribute to the
economic well-being of the other party. In light of this relationship, coupled with the administration's inability to identify physician incompetence, the impetus to curtail a physician's use of
hospital facilities generally does not come from the hospital. °2
Instead, limitations on a physician's use of a hospital come from
other physicians. By organizing themselves into formal medical
staffs, physicians concentrate their individual authority to affect
the financial stability of the hospital and create a separate entity
that has substantial control over the hospital's operations. Medical
staff authority not only controls hospital operations, but also has a
profound effect on the structure and process of peer review.
B.

The Role of HospitalAccreditation

Hospital accreditation organizations, controlled by physicians,
have been perhaps the most influential force shaping the peer review process. In 1919, as part of an effort to establish minimum
standards for hospital care, the American College of Surgeons
adopted a requirement that any hospital seeking its approval must
organize its affiliated physicians into a medical staff. 0 3 This staff
was required to adopt rules governing the professional practices of
the physicians in the hospital "and to review and analyze regularly
their clinical experiences."'" The standards of the American College of Surgeons eventually became the accreditation standards of
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). 0 5 The JCAHO is a private accreditation organization that is governed by a board composed of commissioners
from the American College of Physicians, the American College of
Surgeons, the American Dental Association, the American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association. '0 Obviously, the JCAHO is heavily influenced by physicians. Under the
JCAHO's standards, the hospital's medical staff plays a major role
in ensuring that each staff member is qualified through the peer
102. Hospitals are concerned, however, with possible liability for negligent selection
or review of staff members. For a discussion of corporate negligence, see infra notes 12941 and accompanying text.
103. Goldberg, supra note 92, at 67-68.
104. Id. (quoting L. DAVIS, FELLOWSHIP OF SURGEONS 205, 204 n.65 (1960)); see
also Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitalsand HospitalMedical Staffs to Regulate the Quality
of Patient Care, 129 W.I. MED. 443, 445-46 (1978).
105. Goldberg, supra note 92, at 68.
106. Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Private Regulation of
Healthcareand the Public Interest, 24 B.C.L. REv. 835, 840-60 (1983).
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review system. 107 In addition, the staff must provide regular mechanisms to monitor medical staff practices and functions.108
The JCAHO acts as a quality control agency for hospitals and,
although JCAHO accreditation is voluntary, l°9 it is valuable to
hospitals in several significant respects. First, the federal government relies heavily upon JCAHO accreditation to certify hospitals
for participation in the Medicare program.110 If a hospital is accredited by the JCAHO, it generally will be deemed to comply
with Medicare's conditions of participation for hospitals.1 1 Without satisfying these conditions, a hospital cannot receive reimbursement from the Medicare program." 2 Other private thirdparty payors, such as Blue Cross, also require JCAHO accredita13
tion as a payment prerequisite.'
Thirty-nine states have elevated certain JCAHO standards to the
level of law by incorporating them into their hospital licensing statutes.II 4 As a result, eighty percent of all acute-care hospitals in the
United States are accredited by the JCAHO, and therefore have
complied with the JCAHO's standards for physician quality
control." I
The 1989 JCAHO Hospital Accreditation Manual contains specific standards for the governing body, administration, and medical

staff. 1 6 A detailed review of these provisions is beyond the scope
of this Article. The standards concerning quality assurance and
107. See generally JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORG., AcCREDITATION MANUAL FOR Hosps., 1990 MED. STAFF STANDARDS (1990). The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals recently changed its name to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations.
108. See, e.g., id. at M.S.3.7, M.S.6, and M.S.6.l.
109. See id. at xv.
110. Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH)
12,660 (hospitals accredited by the
JCAHO are deemed to meet all of the Medicare conditions of participation for hospitals);
Jost, supra note 106, at 853.
111. Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH)
12,660.
112. Id.
113. Jost, supra note 106, at 912.
114. Id.; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0115(3)(G) (1990) (the procedures for
medical staff disciplinary actions must comply with the standards of the JCAHO). Today most state hospital licensure laws and regulations require hospitals to have semiautonomous medical staffs with separate bylaws. See Hall, supra note 88 at 528-29 (citing
AM. Hosp. A., Hosp. STATISTICS (1985) (fifty-state survey of law controlling the organized medical staff)).
115. Jost, supra note 106, at 911. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of institutions surveyed by the JCAHO are accredited. Id. Recently, the JCAHO denied full or
provisional accreditation to only one percent of the institutions surveyed. Id.

116.

JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORG., ACCREDITATION

MANUAL FOR Hosps., 1989 MED. STAFF STANDARDS (1989) [hereinafter, JCAHO AcCREDITATION MANUAL, 1989].
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peer review, however, help to explain why hospitals operate as they
do regarding these matters.
A JCAHO-accredited hospital must have a "single organized
medical staff that has overall responsibility for the quality of the
professional services provided by individuals with clinical privileges as well as the responsibility of accounting therefor to the governing body.""1 7 State hospital licensure statutes and regulations
also have mandated the existence of a separate medical staff with a
number of quality control roles in the institution. 8
The medical staff of a JCAHO-accredited hospital must develop
and adopt its own "bylaws, rules and regulations to establish a
framework for self-governance... and accountability to the board
of directors." 9 The medical staff bylaws must be adopted by the
staff and approved by the board. 20 Moreover, neither the staff nor
the board may amend these bylaws unilaterally. 2 ' The bylaws
normally include: the election of medical staff officers; the establishment of various staff committees, clinical departments, and
medical staff categories (i.e., active, associate, or courtesy); and the
establishment of standards and procedures for physician appoint117. Id. at MS.1.
118. See Roberts, Coale & Redman, A History of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 258 J. A.M.A. 936, 939 (1987); see also, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-401(28) (1990) (an "organized medical staff" is a formal organization of physicians
with the authority and responsibility to maintain proper standards of care in the hospital); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.011(3)(a) (1990) (the governing body of each hospital shall
set standards and procedures to be applied by the hospital and its medical staff in considering and acting upon applications for staff membership or professional clinical privileges); IND. CODE § 16-10-1-6.5(a)(z) (1990) (the governing body of the hospital, with the
advice and recommendations of the medical staff, is responsible for the appointment of
the members of the medical staff and the granting of clinical privileges); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 73-25-93 (1989) (a hospital may deny or limit the privileges of an applicant or
staff member if the governing body, after consultation with the medical staff, considers
the physician to be unqualified because of unprofessional conduct, incompetency, or disciplinary action taken by his peers); Mo. REV. STAT. § 205.195(2) (1990) (the organized
medical staff shall initiate and adopt bylaws and policies governing the professional activities in the hospital); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-2046 (1986) (each hospital must cause a
medical staff committee to be formed and operated for the purpose of reviewing the medical care provided in the hospital); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(A) (Anderson
1988) (the hospital's board must set standards and procedures to be applied by the hospital and its medical staff in acting upon applicants for staff membership or clinical privileges); ORE. REV. STAT. § 441.055(3)(d) (1990) (the hospital must ensure that its
physicians are organized into a medical staff so as to effectively review the professional
practices of the hospital); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-3 10 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (each hospital
must have a single organized medical staff that has the overall responsibility for the quality of medical care provided).
119. JCAHO ACCREDITATION MANUAL, 1989, supra note 116, at MS.2.
120. Id. at MS.2.1 and GB.1.18.1.
121. Id. at MS.2.1.
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ment, reappointment, and corrective action. 122 Under JCAHO
standards, physicians who are not appointed or reappointed, or
who are subject to corrective action, are entitled to a fair hearing
and appellate review by the hospital's medical staff.1 23 State hospital licensing laws also can require a hospital to provide a review
process for physicians. 24 The common law in certain states similarly affords physicians due process rights.' 25 The final decision
regarding the appointment, reappointment, or disciplining of a
physician, however, rests with the board, as governing body of the
hospital, after it has received recommendations from the medical
staff. 126

C.

The Effect of the Corporate Negligence Doctrine

The board's ultimate authority in matters of appointment, reappointment, or disciplining of a physician should not be taken
lightly. In recent cases, the judicial view of hospitals as functioning merely as "physicians' workshops" has given way to viewing
122.

Chayet & Reardon, supra note 29, at 304.

JCAHO ACCREDITATION MANUAL, 1989, supra note 116, at MS.2.4.2.
124. See, eg., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 250.310 (1985). The statute provides:
123.

The medical staff shall be organized in accordance with written bylaws, rules
and regulations, approved by the Governing Board. The bylaws, rules and regulations shall specifically provide but not be limited to the following provisions:
(1) written procedures relating to the acceptance and processing of initial
applications for medical staff membership, granting and denying of medical staff
reappointment, and medical staff membership or clinical privileges disciplinary
matters.
(A) The procedures for initial applicants at any particular hospital may
differ from those for current medical staff members. However, the procedures
at any particular hospital shall be applied equally to each practitioner eligible
for medical staff membership under Section 250.150 (Medical Staff) of this
Part....
(B) The procedure shall grant to current medical staff members at least:
written notice of an adverse decision by the Governing Board; an explanation
and reasons for an adverse decision; the right to examine and/or present copies
of relevant information, if any, related to an adverse decision; an opportunity to
appeal an adverse decision; and written notice of the decision resulting from the
appeal. The procedures for providing written notice shall include time frames
for giving such notice.
Id.
125. See, e.g., Kelly v. St. Vincent Hosp., 102 N.M. 201, 692 P.2d 1350 (1984); Miller
v. National Medical Hosp. of Monterey Park, Inc., 124 Cal. App. 3d 81, 177 Cal. Rptr.
119 (1981); Holmes v. Hoemako Hosp., 117 Ariz. 403, 573 P.2d 477 (1977); Silver v.
Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Haw. 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972);
Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 995 (1971); Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
126. JCAHO ACCREDITATION MANUAL, 1989, supra note 116, at MS.5.8 and
MS.1.2.3.1.8.
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hospitals as responsible for granting staff membership and privileges only to competent physicians.1 27 The current view is that a
hospital owes a duty to its patients to exercise reasonable care in
selecting its medical staff members and in granting clinical privileges. 28 This duty arises out of the doctrine of corporate negligence first enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital. 29 In Darling, the
court found that a hospital may be negligent for failure to review a
patient's treatment at the hospital and failure to require appropriate consultations with medical staff members. 30 The court held
that hospitals have a duty to provide a sufficient number of trained
nurses for bedside care of all patients at all times. These nurses,
the court stated, must be capable of recognizing progressive and'
dangerous conditions of patients requiring additional medical attention. Additionally, the court imposed upon the hospital a duty
to ensure that its medical staff sought consultation with other staff
members in complicated cases. These duties were predicated on
language found in state hospital rules and regulations, JCAHO accreditation standards, and the bylaws, rules, and regulations of the
hospital. "' Darling established that a hospital has an independent
responsibility to patients to supervise the medical treatment provided by its staff members. 32 It has been described as the "most
127. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984); Elam v. College
Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); Johnson v. Misericordia
Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.E.2d 156 (1981); Corleto v. Shore Memorial
Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975).
128. See cases cited supra note 127.
129. 33 Ill.
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1965).
130. Id
131. Id. Since Darling was decided, at least 18 states have adopted the corporate.
negligence doctrine. See Insinga v.La Bella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989) (the Florida
Supreme Court adopted the doctrine and stated that at least 17 other states had done so);
see also Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 370 Pa. Super. 115, 535 A.2d 1177 (1988); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987); Hannola v. Lakewood, 68 Ohio App. 2d
61, 426 N.E.2d 1187 (1980).
132. The court in Darlingstated:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does
not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead
simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects
the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ
on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes [sic], as well as
administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care
and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of "hospital facilities" expects that the
hospitals will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will
act on their own responsibility.
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influential hospital law opinion of the last 50 years."133
The doctrine of corporate negligence is based upon the perception of the modem hospital as a multifaceted health care facility
responsible for the quality of medical care and treatment rendered.13 4 Hospitals have evolved into complex corporate institutions assuming "the role of a comprehensive health center
ultimately responsible for arranging and coordinating total health
care." 135 Hospital patients receive care from a number of individuals of varying capacities and are not merely treated by a physician
acting in isolation.1 3 6 As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:
The concept that a hospital does not undertake to treat patients,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but
only procures them to act solely upon their own responsibility,
no longer reflects the fact. The complex manner of operation of
the modern-day medical institution clearly demonstrates that
they furnish far more than mere facilities for treatment. They
appoint physicians and surgeons to their medical staffs, as well as
regularly employing on a salary basis resident physicians and surgeons, nurses, administrative and manual workers and they
charge patients for medical diagnosis, care, treatment and therapy, receiving payment for such services through privately financed medical insurance policies and government financed
programs known as Medicare and Medicaid. Certainly, the person who avails himself of our modern "hospital facilities" (frequently a medical teaching institution) expects that the hospital
staff will do all it reasonably can to cure him and does not anticiemployees will be acting
pate that its nurses, doctors and other
137
responsibility.
own
their
on
solely
Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that "[t]he hospital's role is no longer limited to the furnishing of physical facilities
and equipment where a physician treats his private patients and
practices medicine in his own individualized manner." 138 In short,
Darling, 33 Ill. 2d at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257 (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 661,
143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957); see also Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d
226, 229, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (1984).
133. Hall, supra note 88, at 459.
134. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d at 231, 677 P.2d at 169.
135. Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-ExpandingResponsibilities Change
Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429 (1973).
136. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d at 231, 677 P.2d at 169.
137. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 724, 301 N.W.2d
156, 164 (1981).
138. Moore v. Board of Trustees, 88 Nev. 207, 212, 495 P.2d 605, 608, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 879 (1972).
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in the eyes of the law, the era of hospitals functioning merely as
"physicians' workshops" is over.
Instead, under current law, hospitals have a direct and independent responsibility to their patients, over and above the duties of the physicians within the hospital. Hospitals now are
required to take reasonable steps to ensure that their medical staffs
are qualified for the privileges granted to them by the hospital, and
to evaluate the care provided by them through the prudent selection, review, and continuing evaluation of the physicians granted
staff privileges.' 39 To satisfy this duty, the hospital's governing
body must rely on its medical staff, and in particular on the credentials committee, to investigate and evaluate the qualifications of
medical staff applicants. 40 However, this delegation to the staff
"does not relieve the governing body of its duty to appoint only
qualified physicians and surgeons to [the] staff and periodically to
monitor and review their competency." 141
The doctrine of hospital corporate negligence, particularly in the
context of physician credentialing and supervision, has altered significantly the relationship among hospitals, medical staffs, and individual physicians. Although at one time hospitals had little
incentive to limit the practices of physicians within their institutions, because to do so would reduce hospital revenue, today the
failure to monitor and correct physician deficiencies can be quite
costly. Ironically, while hospitals are now charged with the responsibility of monitoring the quality of care provided by their staff
physicians within the hospitals, the responsibility for monitoring
individual physicians rests almost entirely with the medical staff.
D.

The Anticompetitive Nature of Peer Review

As a result of certain state hospital licensing statutes, laws regarding reimbursement for services involving hospitalization, judicial decisions regarding medical staff disputes and negligent
credentialing or supervision of physicians, and JCAHO accreditation standards, nearly every hospital in the United States now requires an extensive medical staff credentialing and review process.
139. Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 725, 301 N.W.2d at 165; Elam v. College Park Hosp.,
132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 164 (1982); see also Blanton v. Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp., Inc., 319 N.C. 372, 354 S.E.2d 455 (1987) ("hospital owes a duty
of care to its patients to ascertain that a doctor is qualified to perform an operation before
granting him the privilege to do so"); Janulis & Hornstein, Damned if You Do, Damned if
You Don 't: Hospital'sLiabilityfor Physician's Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REv. 689 (1985).
140. Johnson, 99 Wis. 2d at 744, 301 N.W.2d at 174.
141. Id.

388
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A physician's seeking appointment or reappointment, or potentially becoming subject to corrective action, generally triggers a
process that involves input from: (1) the appropriate clinical department, (2) the medical staff credentials committee, (3) the medical staff executive committee, (4) the ad hoc hearing committee,
and (5) an appellate review committee of the board of directors.
This process can be long, difficult, and expensive. Moreover, if it is
properly and convincingly, it may lead to costly
not executed
42
litigation. ,
The potential for abuse of this process is striking. Physicians can
place pressure on a hospital "in the name of quality of care that in
reality is motivated by a desire to enhance prestige, increase convenience, further professional rivalries, or protect or enhance their
economic positions."' 43For example, there is currently an oversupply of certain specialists, which creates a buyer's market for hospitals'" and may foster hostility from incumbent staff members in
those specialties. The adverse economic effect of increased competition resulting from an oversupply of physicians has created an
to misusing the peer review process to deatmosphere conducive
45
competition.
stroy
Peer review is inherently anticompetitive.' 46 The process described above, as mandated by state law and the JCAHO, requires
physicians to exercise their authority to limit or exclude business
opportunities for other practitioners in their field when these competitors fail to meet certain standards. The members of the medical staff engaged in the peer review process are independent
practitioners competing with other practitioners for patients. 147
The peer review process allows competitors to have substantial influence, if not actual control, over a competitor's access to the marketplace. As a result, it is difficult to accept that physicians, who
are fighting to maintain their practices and incomes, will review
their competitors objectively.' 48 It is equally unrealistic to expect
the unfavorably reviewed physician to accept that anticompetitive
142.
143.

See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
INST. OF MED., NAT'L. ACAD. OF Sci., FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH

173 (1986).
144. Nord, The Big Change, BRIEF, Winter 1985, at 7.
145. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
146. Curran, supra note 28, at 233-35.
147. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1060 (1985).
148. Chenen, Peer Review-It's Time for a Change, 4 MED. STAFF COUNSELOR 75
CARE

(1990).
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motives did not affect the review. 149
E.

The CurrentEnvironment

Two major developments have eroded the effectiveness of the
physician-controlled peer review structure within hospitals. First,
the doctrine of hospital corporate negligence has given hospital
boards and administrators great incentive to participate actively in
deciding who will be allowed to use their facilities and to what
extent they will be allowed to do so. 1 50 The second major development is the actual or perceived oversupply of physicians in certain
communities, which has given physicians an incentive to place
their personal financial considerations above the hospital's concerns for quality of care.'15 This second development has led to
antitrust lawsuits brought by disgruntled physicians against hospitals and their reviewers. These suits have caused physicians either
not to participate in peer review, or to do so without rendering
decisions that adversely affect the physician under review. This
situation creates a dilemma for physicians. On the one hand, some
physicians may wish to use peer review as a means to control or
eliminate competition. On the other hand, many physicians are
unwilling to participate in peer review if their participation will
likely result in litigation. In short, the intrahospital peer review
structure is incompatible with the new legal and economic environment affecting hospitals.
Although a board of directors has ultimate responsibility for the
peer review decisions of its staff physicians, boards historically
have deferred to recommendations of medical staffs because of the
board's perception of the staff's superior medical judgment. This
situation, however, now creates a dilemma for the board. On the
one hand, it must reasonably exercise its responsibility to control
the quality of care provided by the individual members of the medical staff.152 On the other hand, the board cannot trust the judgment of the physician peer reviewers to be based completely or
even substantially upon quality of care concerns. 53 The difficulty
of identifying good or bad quality of care among physicians further
complicates the board's task. Therefore, the board must identify
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

129-41
143-49
129-41
143-49

and
and
and
and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
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quality in health care without always having the unbiased expertise
to do so.
IV.

THE OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE PEER REVIEW

Three factors hamper the effectiveness of intrahospital peer review as a quality control mechanism: (1) the historical use of peer
review as a form of political power among physicians within the
medical profession, (2) physicians' natural disincentive to criticize
their immediate colleagues, and (3) the difficulty of identifying or
measuring inadequate performance of physicians. Neither the Act
nor its legislative history address these obstacles to peer review. As
a result, the Act, in all likelihood, will fail to accomplish its objective of encouraging "effective professional peer review." 1 54
A.

The History of Peer Review

In the early years of peer review, medical staff "appointment decisions depended largely on non-technical considerations, such as
personality and social background."155 For example, one hospital
executive explained that in earlier days of hospital administration,
competitive examinations for interns were discontinued because
the people who scored highest on these tests were Jewish. 56 The
physician's need for hospital staff membership and privileges made
the physician dependent on the "inner fraternity" of the profession."" A physician's career depended upon his relationship with
his professional colleagues.1 58 Access to important positions in
hospitals came through "sponsorship" by established physicians,
who could advance or exclude aspirants at various stages of their
careers by influencing professional school admissions, dispensing
hospital appointments, referring patients, and designating proteges and successors. Because the hospital was essential to successful practice, its various grades could be used as delicately
calibrated rewards to signal the progress of a career.' 59
Thus, physicians have long used their power to grant or withdraw
hospital privileges as a means to regulate professional and personal
154.

42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1988).

155. P. STARR, supra note 91, at 167.
156. Id. at 168 (citing CLEVELAND HosP.

COUNCIL, CLEVELAND

HosP.

AND

HEALTH SURVEY 858, 863 (1920)); Hall, The Stages of a Medical Career,53 AM. J. Soc.
331 (1948).
157. P. STARR, supra note 91, at 168.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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behavior.16 o
In the 1950s and 1960s, local medical hierarchies of private
practitioners ran the American hospital system. 161 As in earlier
years, informal networks of physicians, often using ethnic or religious grounds, effectively excluded outsiders, built up "dominant
positions for elite physicians," granted and maintained professional
status, controlled physician behavior, and minimized medical competition and conflict. 162 Collective physician professional standardsetting during this period was weak. 163 Intrahospital physician appraisal of quality and outcomes of hospital care was marked by
mild criticism, data production without analysis, and lack of meetings. 164 Even with the help of computer systems that could produce reams of data during the late 1950s and 1960s, there was little
critical review of physician performance in hospitals.16 The medical staff's overriding ethos was to maximize individual physician
autonomy, avoid standardizing procedures, and provide little peer
criticism of physicians.166
The systematic exclusion of outsiders from hospital medical
staffs has manifested itself most recently in a number of federal
antitrust and civil rights cases. For example, in 1973, when the
Medicare program began reimbursing for chiropractor services, the
American Medical Association (AMA) became concerned that
hospitals would admit chiropractors to their medical staffs. Accordingly, it published an article that offered advice to hospital
trustees across the United States, and advised that hospitals might
160. Id As to the effect of this power on quality, Paul Starr wrote:
It is unclear whether the use of this power in the early twentieth century did
raise the quality of private practice in America. But there can be no doubt it
was used to exclude doctors unacceptable to the organized profession. By the
twenties, membership in the local medical society had become an informal prerequisite for membership on the staff of most local hospitals. In 1934 the AMA
tried to institutionalize its control over hospital appointments by requiring all
hospitals accredited for internship training to appoint no one to their staff except members of the local medical society. Black doctors, who were excluded
from the local societies, could be kept out of hospital positions on those
grounds. So could anyone else who threatened to rock the boat. The private
practitioners, who had first seen hospitals as a threat to their position, had succeeded in converting them into an instrument of professional power.
Id. at 168-69.
161. R. STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH 242 (1989).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 246.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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lose their accreditation if they dealt with chiropractors. 16 7
In 1976, chiropractors sued the AMA, among others, for violating federal antitrust laws. 168 The court found that the AMA and
its members participated in a conspiracy against chiropractors in
violation of these laws. 169 In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied heavily on evidence that the AMA considered chiropractic
an unscientific cult and that it was unethical for a physician to
associate professionally with chiropractors. 70 According to the
court, the AMA instituted this boycott to prevent: (1) physicians
from referring patients to chiropractors and accepting referrals of
patients from chiropractors, and (2) chiropractors from obtaining
access to hospital
diagnostic services and membership on hospital
7
medical staffs.1 1
Osteopaths also have been excluded from hospitals. In Weiss v.
York Hospital, 72 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
exclusion of osteopaths from a hospital's medical staff constituted a
per se illegal boycott by the staff physicians in violation of the
Sherman Act.1 73 Although osteopaths have had less success in
other cases, these lawsuits suggest that access to hospital facilities
is a major source of conflict between physicians and other health
74
care providers.
Podiatrists have met similar resistance in their efforts to obtain
hospital privileges.' 75 Nurse-anesthetists and nurse-midwives also
167. Simonaitis, The Right and Duty of Hospitals to Exclude Chiropractors,226 J.
A.M.A. 829 (1973).
168. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1474 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
169. Id.
170. Id
171. Id
172. 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
173. Id at 280 (a per se discrimination rule, as opposed to a rule of reason, applied
because exclusion of osteopaths from medical staff was not based on a legitimate explanation, such as being less qualified as a group than M.D.s).
174. See, e.g., Hull v. Board of Comm'rs of Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 453 So. 2d
519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (state nondiscrimination statute was not violated by criteria that excluded osteopaths because the criteria applied equally to osteopaths and medical doctors); but see Fritz v. Huntington Hosp., 39 N.Y.2d 339, 348 N.E.2d 547, 384
N.Y.S.2d 92 (1976) (hospital's rejection of an osteopath's staff application for failing to
complete an M.D. training program was reviewable under a New York statute); cf Stem
v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 755 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), vacated, 778 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986) (a medical postdoctoral-training requirement did not violate an osteopath's constitutional right to equal protection); Don v.
Okmulgee Memorial Hosp., 443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971) (denial of staff privileges did
not violate an osteopath's due process rights).
175. See Health Care Management Corp., 107 F.T.C. 285 (1986) (Federal Trade
Commission consent order prohibited Alabama hospital and its medical staff from imposing restrictions that effectively excluded podiatrists from the hospital); Hatch v. North
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have challenged the exclusionary practices of hospitals and physicians. 17 6 A handful of cases brought by outsiders, such as foreign
medical graduates, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act M and
other civil rights laws further suggests that the hospital-medical
staff environment described by Paul Starr and Rosemary Stevens is
78
still with us today.'
B. Peer Review and Peer Pressure
Perhaps the most significant disincentive for physicians to participate in peer review is their fear of the professional and personal
consequences arising out of such participation. Physicians are reluctant to engage in peer review for a number of reasons, including:
loss of referrals, respect, and friends; possible retaliation; and vulnerability to litigation.1 9 In light of the historical roots of peer
Colo. Medical Center, 1986-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 67,268 (D. Colo. 1986); Cooper v.
Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 685 (M.D.N.C., 1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d
278 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986) (various hospital staff committees successfully opposed medical staff bylaw amendments that would have allowed podiatrists
onto the medical staff); Kaczanowski v. Medical Center Hosp., 612 F. Supp. 688 (D.C.
Vt. 1985) (podiatrist alleged a conspiracy among 17 hospitals); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 752 F.2d 647 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985) (same); but see Dooley v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 11 Ohio
St. 3d 216, 465 N.E.2d 58 (1984) (medical staff bylaws discriminated against podiatrists
as a group.); Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., Inc., 58 N.C. App. 414, 293
S.E.2d 901 (1982); Settler v. Hopedale Medical Found., 80 111. App. 3d 1074, 400 N.E.2d
577 (3d. Dist. 1980); Charter Medical Corp. v. Miller, 605 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980) (alleged denial of civil rights).
176. See Nurse Midwifery Ass'n v. Hibbett, 689 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1988),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Nos. 88-5842, 89-5491 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file) (a physician-controlled insurance company denied medical
malpractice insurance to a physician who served as a backup physician to certified nursemidwives); Medical Staff of Memorial Medical Center, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,508 (Jan. 28, 1988) (Federal Trade Commission consent order prohibited medical staff
from denying hospital privilege to nurse-midwives without a reasonable basis); Oltz v. St.
Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) (anesthesiologists and hospital
conspired to exclude a nurse-anesthetist in violation of the Sherman Act); Wicker v.
Union County Gen. Hosp., 673 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (denial of staff privileges
to a nurse-anesthetist).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
178. See Diggs v. Harris Hosp., 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 956
(1988) (alleged discrimination on the basis of race and sex); Mitchell v. Frank R. Howard
Memorial Hosp., 853 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1988) (alleged discrimination against a Mormon
physician); Pardazi v. Cullman Medical Center, 838 F.2d 1155 (11th Cir. 1988) (alleged
discrimination against an Iran-educated medical practitioner); Mousovi v. Beebe Hosp.,
674 F. Supp. 145 (D.C. Del. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1988) (alleged discrimination against an Iranian physician); Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 572 F.
Supp. 1424 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (alleged discrimination against a Serbian-Yugoslavian
physician).
179. Humana Hosp. Desert Valley v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 396, 400, 742 P.2d
1382, 1386 (Ct. App. 1987).
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review and the importance physicians still attach to their relationships with physician-colleagues, legislation may not succeed in protecting a physician from the professional damage he might cause
by participation in peer review. The mere potential for retaliation
from colleagues, loss of friendship, or loss of referrals may discourage most physicians from engaging in peer review in all but the
most egregious cases.
Ironically, although physicians have been given the power to
control access to hospital facilities by virtue of their special expertise, they may have little incentive for exercising this power to promote quality of care.
C. The Difficulty of Identifying Quality Health Care
The most fundamental assumption about the efficacy of peer review is that quality of medical care can be measured or evaluated
to support decisions about who may become or remain a part of a
hospital's medical staff.80° An accepted methodology for evaluation of quality health care, however, has yet to be developed.'"' As
one commentator has stated, "[t]he art and science of quality assurance and peer review [in health care] are still in their infancy."' 8 2 It was not until December 10, 1988, that the JCAHO
officially adopted a definition of quality patient care.8 3 According
to this definition, quality patient care is measured by the "degree to
which patient-care services increase the probability of desired patient outcomes and reduce the probability of undesired outcomes,
given the current state of knowledge."'"
Avedis Donabedian, a leading expert in the field of health care
180. Bartels & O'Donnell, QualityCriteriafor Medical StaffAdmission: A Beginning,
34 Hose. AND HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 269, 272 (1989).
181. Id. at 273.
182. Thompson, Exploding 12 Myths About Quality Assurance and Peer Review, 2
MED. STAFF Cours. 39,-39 (1988).
183. JCAHO Adopts Definition of Quality Patient Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec.
16, 1988, at 10.
184. Id. The JCAHO has recently selected 17 hospitals to test new clinical indicators
that will monitor care provided to trauma, cardiovascular, and oncology patients.
JCAHO Selects 17 Test Sites for New Clinical Indicators,MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 27,
1989, at 9. Over the past two years 17 other hospitals have been using JCAHO-developed
indicators to monitor the quality of obstetrical and anesthesia care. Id. These indicators
are designed to describe measurable care processes, clinical events, complications, and
outcomes. Michael R. Callahan, Barrows and Other Medical Staff Legal Issues (September 22, 1989) (unpublished presentation to the Illinois Association of Hospital Attorneys
at its Seventh Annual Health Law Symposium). Examples of indicators include death,
hospital acquired infection, severe adverse drug reaction, and return to the operating
room from the recovery room. Id These quality of care indicators may eventually be
used to evaluate hospital physicians. Id
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quality assessment, has identified three elements for assessing quality in health care: structure, outcome, and process.18 An assessment of structure involves the evaluation of the relatively stable
characteristics of the hospital environment, such as the condition
of the physical plant and the extent and quality of its equipment
and support services.18 6 Quality structure is measured by the sufficiency of resources and systems of the hospital.1 8 7 For example, a
rural community hospital typically will not have the medical support staff and technology found in tertiary care institutions, such as
major teaching hospitals. Structure affects quality by increasing or
decreasing the probability of favorable results, but it is only an indicator of general tendencies for the institution.1s 8
Perhaps the most graphic indicator of quality in health care, or
lack thereof, is outcome. Outcome analysis measures the change in
a patient's- health that results from the physician's intervention. 189
Donabedian asserts that "outcomes tend to be inherently valid in
the sense that there is usually no need to argue whether they are, in
themselves, good or bad. For example, there is general agreement
that life is preferable to death, functional integrity preferable to
disability, and comfort preferable to pain."' 9° The major problem
with outcome analysis is that little is known about the efficacy of
certain treatments or practices on a patient's condition.' 9 ' Studies
have shown tremendous variations in the rate at which surgical
procedures are performed in various localities despite similar demographic and health profiles.192 Physicians have not reached a consensus on when certain procedures should be performed. Only a
small number of medical procedures have been subject to rigorous
controlled clinical trials. 93 It is even more difficult to determine
whether a generally effective treatment accomplishes positive results when applied to a particular patient. 94 In other words, it is
185. A. DONABEDIAN, 1 THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS
ASSESSMENT 79-84 (1980).
186. Id. at 81.
187. Id. at 82.
188. Id
189. Id at 82-83.
190. Id. at 102.
191. Horwitz, Measuring Quality of Care, 2 MED. STAFF COUNS. 31, 32-33 (1988).
192. Hall, supra note 88, at 480.
193. Id. at 481 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 7 (1978)) ("It has been estimated that
only 10 to 20 percent of all procedures currently used in medical practice have been
shown to be efficacious by controlled trial").
194. Id
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difficult to attribute a positive outcome to a particular course of
treatment.
Nevertheless, bad results are typically the prime reason for a
hospital's decision to take a closer look at the practices, or process,
of the responsible physician. The focal point of peer review, thus,
is the process a physician follows in treating a patient, and this
process usually is not questioned unless and until it yields bad results for patients. 19"
In the evaluation of physicians, the simplest complete unit of
care is the physician's management of a discrete episode of illness
in a given patient. 196 This management has both technical and interpersonal dimensions.'97 Quality technical care consists of the
application of medical science and technology to the patient's illness in a way that maximizes health benefits without increasing
health risks. 98 Interpersonal care involves the social and psychological interaction between the physician and patient, and its quality depends upon the conformity of the physician's acts with
commonly accepted, socially defined values and norms that govern
the interrelationship between the parties.' 99 Identifying norms of
care in light of scientific uncertainty, however, is a difficult, if not
impossible, undertaking.
Of the two aspects of medical care management, peer review is
concerned primarily with the technical aspects of care. Technical
care consists of identifying the patient's problem, identifying goals,
selecting treatment, and providing treatment. 2° In order to judge
a physician's performance in any particular case, the norms of care
for the condition in question must be identified. 20 1 For peer review
to be effective, a group of practitioners must be able to "predict
195. Similarly, as part of the Medicare program, federal peer review organizations
(PROs) perform a retrospective review of medical records to determine, in part, whether
physician services are of a quality which "meet[ ] professionally recognized standards of
health care." 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(1)(B) (1988). The PROs are authorized to recommend sanctions to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for physicians who either
failed in a substantial number of cases to satisfy the appropriate performance standard or
grossly and flagrantly violated it. Id. § 1320c-5(b)(1). Physicians who are sanctioned by
PROs may not meet certain minimum standards for the privilege of practicing at a particular hospital. However, these sanctions do not help hospitals to identify physicians
who might be less obviously unqualified to practice medicine at their institutions or who
fail to meet some higher standard of care.
196.

A. DONABEDIAN, supra note 185, at 4-6.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Donabedian, Quality, Cost and Clinical Decisions, 468 ANNALS 196, 200 (1983).
Id.

1991]

Health Care Quality Improvement Act

what the outcomes should be for patients of a certain age and general health status with a particular diagnosis, ifoptimal achievable
care is provided. ' 20 2 These predictions then serve as benchmarks
20 3
or norms against which the results of actual care are measured.
Unless the delivery of patient care is based upon pure guesswork,
these standards must exist. Only in this way can peer reviewers
make systematic and clear determinations whether poor results
were clinically unavoidable or whether the care contributed to
these results.2°
Much of peer review, however, is not conducted on the basis of
statistically significant and otherwise appropriate norms. Rather,
peer review often involves a small number of practitioners reviewing a small number of a particular physician's patient charts.
Under these circumstances, patterns of care seldom are determined.20 5 This approach "seriously limits the usefulness of review
findings, because the disclosure of an isolated occurrence of anything but the grossest error cannot be the basis for any meaningful
action. ' ' 2°6 Isolated poor outcomes may not identify incompetent
practitioners.
These limited chart reviews also suffer from too much subjectivity. 207 As one group of commentators explained, this approach is
not based on an objectively identified standard of care; rather, each
reviewer relies on his or her implicit and subjective clinical judgments in reviewing the patient's chart. 20 ' Thus, the review is only
as good as the reviewer.
A chart-by-chart peer review process also makes corrective action difficult to implement because the deficiencies are not identified according to objective measures. 20 9 Patterns of deficiencies
based on proper norms must be evident in order to select appropriate corrective action. 210 Only under these circumstances will participants approach peer review as a scientific activity and not
succumb to the social, psychological, professional, and economic
202. C. JACOBS, T. CHRISTOFFEL & N. DIXON, MEASURING THE QUALITY OF PATIENT CARE: THE RATIONALE FOR OUTCOME AUDIT 2 (1976) [hereinafter JACOBS,
CHRISTOFFEL & DIXON].
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 27.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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pressures typically directed at peer reviewers. 211 Chart-by-chart
review moves the focus of peer review from the care provided to
the competence of the reviewer. As long as peer review is not
based upon objective clinical standards determined through statistically significant sample sizes, the actions it yields are subject to
question. Physicians, who understand this fundamental problem
with peer review, are extremely reluctant to participate in it. The
lack of objectivity in peer review may be the single greatest cause of
the litigation the Act was designed to reduce or eliminate.
This lack of objectivity seems to stem from the art-versus-science
dichotomy of medical care.21 2 Understanding this dichotomy lies
at the heart of evaluating the quality of patient care. The uncertainty created by this dichotomy affects the clinical judgment of
physicians. As a result, evaluating a physician's clinical judgment
or actions becomes extremely difficult.
Physicians have relied on this uncertainty to establish domains
of control and influence free from outside review.21 3 Scientific consensus on clinical practice would greatly improve the ability of lay
persons, such as hospital administrators and board members, to
evaluate physicians. For this reason, the medical profession has
been reluctant to work toward developing this consensus. 2 4 The
profession relies on clinical uncertainty to defeat even internal
oversight by peers.21 5 In general, the peer review process should
help identify and develop practice norms. Once a physician has
become the subject of peer review, the hospital's physician review
committee will collect all of the relevant clinical data the hospital
has at its disposal. This data usually consists of patient medical
211. Id.
212. The process of diagnosing and treating patients requires physicians to rely on
their scientific understanding of the human body and their ability to obtain enough data
from the patient to select a proper treatment. Data collection and evaluation and treatment selection go beyond this scientific understanding. They require physicians to engage in the art of using their judgment and experience to choose a course of treatment
based upon the known facts. This treatment selection process constitutes the art of practicing medicine.
213. Hall, supra note 88, at 477.
214. Id. Hall states:
The profession's motives in suppressing the full play of scientific certainty are
demonstrated by the AMA's active role in demolishing the National Center for
Health Care Technology, an agency whose work was considered critical to
achieving greater standardization in medicine. The AMA argued that "the
center should not make general statements about appropriate medical care" because this was "trying to dictate the practice of medicine."
Id. (citation omitted).
215. Id. at 478.
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records, but may also include incident reports from hospital personnel and support staff who have witnessed the physician's practices at the hospital. Once the physician reviewers identify a
potential quality of care problem, the physician in question has the
burden to justify any deviations from these norms on the basis of
special circumstances presented in a particular case.216 The review,
however, is of doubtful value without objective norms of care.
The goal of peer review is to eliminate or reduce iatrogenesis, or
injuries to patients caused by physicians. In writing about iatrogenesis, Ivan Illich, an outspoken critic of the medical profession, characterized it as a problem of epidemic proportions:
The pain, dysfunction, disability, and anguish resulting from
technical medical intervention now rival the morbidity due to
traffic and industrial accidents and even war-related activities,
one of the most rapidly spreadand make the impact of medicine
217
ing epidemics of our time.
Few studies have attempted to gauge the magnitude of the problem
of iatrogenesis. One study reviewed 815 consecutive admissions to
a medical ward of a university hospital with the following results:
thirty-six percent of the patients studied developed major iatrogenic or minor iatrogenic illnesses; nine percent developed other
major iatrogenic complications that threatened life or limb of the
patients; and two percent died as a result of iatrogenesis. 218 The
study concluded that the risk incurred by patients during hospitalization has not diminished over the last twenty years, and the risk
of serious complications may have increased. 219
The medical profession consistently has resisted efforts to develop performance data for patient care.22 ° In the 1860s, Florence
Nightingale attempted to develop a uniform system for collecting
and presenting hospital statistics broken down according to age,
sex, and disease.22 I This system was not widely accepted.222 A
similar effort in 1908 by E. W. Groves, a British surgeon, seeking
to document operation results, had a limited effect.223 Shortly
thereafter, Dr. Ernest Amory Codmen, crusaded for the adoption
216. JACOBS, CHRISTOFFEL & DIXON, supra note 202, at 41-45.
217. I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH 26-27 (1976).
218. Steel, Gertman, Crescini & Anderson, Jatrogenic Illness on a General Medical
Service at a University Hospital, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 638 (1981).
219. Id. at 641.
220. JACOBS, CHRISTOFFEL & DIXON, supra note 202, at 23-25.
221. Id. at 23.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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of a system to collect and tabulate surgical outcome data. 224 This
effort was met with great resistance from the medical community
and, after World War I, Codmen's idea was defeated.225 With few
isolated exceptions, support for an outcome-oriented physician performance evaluation methodology was nearly nonexistent until the
1950s and 1960s.226 In 1976, the JCAHO advocated the use of
patient outcome audits as a means of measuring and improving the
quality of patient care. 227 Again, the industry generally has not
used this methodology, and the JCAHO is now in the process of
developing a patient outcome assessment program for accrediting
hospitals. As in the past, physicians have managed to escape the
scrutiny of reviewers in search of objectively verifiable standards of
care based upon statistical analyses of patient care outcomes.
Without these standards, however, peer review will continue to
lack statistical or clinical validity.
The governing body of a hospital has the ultimate responsibility
to monitor all three aspects of quality health care in the hospital.
It is directly responsible for the structural aspects of the institution. Through management, it ensures that the facility is structurally sound, adequately equipped, and appropriately staffed to serve
its health care mission. Under the current peer review system,
however, it has delegated supervision over process and outcome to
the medical staff. The legislative history of the Act, and the medical literature addressing iatrogenesis, fail to provide compelling
empirical proof that physician peer review improves the quality of
patient care. Based upon the apparent resistance of the medical
profession to the development of legitimate practice norms, peer
review, as we know it, may have done little, if anything, to improve
the quality of care provided in hospitals. Arguably, peer review
merely has maintained the status quo in hospital care for over the
last twenty years. Yet, it remains the hallmark of every hospital's
quality assurance program.
Further studies of iatrogenesis and ways to reduce it are needed.
While the reasons for physician-caused injury to patients may be
difficult to ascertain or evaluate due to the uncertainties involved in
medical care, these reasons must be explored. If the quality of
medical care cannot be monitored or identified because it is more
art than science, the entire concept of peer review should be re224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
See generally JACOBS, CHRISTOFFEL & DIXON, supra note 202.
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evaluated with the goal of reducing its significant role in hospital
quality assurance. More input from physicians, and perhaps nonphysicians, on the relationship between peer review and quality of
care is critical. Public confidence in hospital care and the future of
a quality assurance system for hospitals hang in the balance.
V.

IMPROVING THE ACT

The Act can be amended to overcome two of the three obstacles
to effective peer review discussed in the previous section. Congress
can amend the Act to diminish the political misuse of the process
and the individual physician's reluctance to criticize a staff colleague. Allowing outside physicians to supply the clinical critique
of the physicians being reviewed can overcome these two obstacles.
However, legislating health care quality, the third obstacle impeding effective peer review, is beyond the reach of Congress. The best
that can be hoped for from health industry legislation is that it will
put in place or promote a process that will yield desired substantive
results. It cannot mandate these results in a way that would help
hospitals identify incompetent or inadequate physicians. Legislators, and society in general, must rely upon medical experts to stay
current with changing modes of medical care to provide in the review process the substantive analysis of a physician's past and
probable future performance. No statute can provide this type of
substantive information.
The question then becomes how hospitals can best obtain the
substantive clinical expertise they need to evaluate their physicians
and staff applicants in light of the political and personal dynamics
that play upon physicians engaged in peer review. An amended
Act could improve the peer review process in three ways: (1) by
creating an incentive to use outside reviewers, (2) by broadening
the scope of the immunity, and (3) by increasing the exposure for
payment of attorney fees and costs.
A. Encourage Outside Review
First, the Act should create an incentive for hospitals to conduct
peer review through the use of third-party reviewers from outside
the hospital. The political dynamics of physician relationships
make the current system of peer review haphazard and unworkable.228 Physicians originally used their economic power over hos228. One commentator recently stated:
It [is]... impossible for peer review--as it traditionally has been conducted-to
continue. Consequently, it is time for a change. Traditional peer review must

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 22

pitals to control medical staff appointments, reappointments, and
corrective actions, and regularly placed their own political and
economic interests over quality-of-care concerns. As long as physicians still choose to allow incompetent or dangerous colleagues to
continue practicing medicine because they fear the potential professional and financial ramifications, and the costs of litigation that
may follow the initiation of "effective peer review," the current
process cannot promote quality. Accordingly, the Act should encourage hospitals to seek the medical expertise essential for proper
physician review from nonstaff physician consultants. 229
Recently enacted legislation in Oregon now permits the State's
Board of Medical Examiners (BME) to appoint one or more physicians to conduct peer review upon request for review from (1) the
physician being reviewed, (2) the executive committee of the medical staff, and (3) the governing body of the hospital. 230 This statute
allows the BME to select a nonstaff expert committee to perform
the review at a particular hospital consistent with that hospital's
medical staff bylaws. 231 The Oregon Medical Association recommends the members of these committees to the BME.232
In Austin v. McNamara,23 a the peer review process, which satisfled the immunity requirements of the Act, involved the use of an
outside independent review by two neurosurgeons appointed by the
California Medical Association. These experts spent a day at the
hospital talking to various staff members and reviewing the patient
charts of the physician under review. They also spent an hour and
a half interviewing the physician.234 This use of outside experts
helped to establish that the hospital's peer review process was fair
and objective. Although the Act allows for the use of these experts, it does not insist on their expertise.
The California Society of Anesthesiology (CSA) also offers its
services to hospitals seeking outside peer review. 235 The hospital
give way to a new system, whereby independent, qualified and objective outside
reviewers do the bulk of the work. This will result in more effective, efficient
peer review, less litigation, and greater fairness to all physicians involved.
Chenen, supra note 148, at 75.
229. See Chayet & Reardon, supra note 29, at 310.
230. OR. REv. STAT. § 441.055(6) (1990).

231.

Id. § 441.055(7).

232. Oregon Responds to Physician'sFears ofPeer Review, Hoses., Jan. 5, 1990 at 70.
This reliance on outside experts has reportedly diffused some physicians' complaints that
they did not receive fair peer reviews. Id. at 71.
233. 731 F. Supp. 934-(C.D. Cal. 1990).
234. Id. at 936.
235. Chenen, supra note 148, at 77.
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and the physician under review must agree to use the CSA reviewer and to be bound by the reviewer's recommendations.236
The review consists of the CSA reviewer visiting the hospital and
meeting all of the relevant parties.237 The reviewer, who has considerable discretion over the scope of the review, may examine only
a few charts or actually may scrub with the physician in question
to observe his clinical performance. 23 The reviewer then prepares
a written report with recommendations. 239 The hospital and the
physician under review usually split the costs of this review.24
Even if the review takes several days, the costs are substantially
less for each party than the costs of litigation.
These examples of the use of outside reviewers to conduct peer
review illustrate its benefits and feasibility. Outside review gives all
concerned parties a sense that the process is fair and objective.
This point should be especially clear to the physician under review
if the critique comes from a practitioner in the physician's own
specialty, and the physician has input into the process. Most importantly, outside experts can provide relatively unbiased recommendations to the hospital regarding the physician in question
with the aim of correcting the deficiencies. Peer review should not
be punitive; it should be a process of identifying and correcting
problems.
Accordingly, hospitals should commission outside medical auditors to review physicians in three instances: appointment, reappointment, and corrective action. To assure patient anonymity
these auditors should be provided with coded medical records and
other quality assurance and utilization data typically maintained
by hospitals. The JCAHO requires hospitals to maintain a number
of committees to collect and discuss such data on a regular basis. 241
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Chayet & Reardon, supra note 29, at 305. Chayet and Reardon describe the
roles of these committees:
[Tihe Tissue Committee provides a monthly surgical case review, including the
indication for surgery in all cases where there is a major discrepancy between
the preoperative and postoperative diagnoses. The Pharmacy and Therapeutics
Committee is responsible for the development and surveillance of polices and
practices in those areas, particularly drug utilization in the hospital. The Medical Records Committee is responsible for reviewing records for timely completion, clinical pertinence, and adequacy for use in patient care evaluation. The
Blood Utilization Review Committee reviews all transfusions. The Antibiotic
Usage Committee reviews the clinical use of antibiotics in the hospital. Finally,
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The auditors should be qualified in the specialties of the physician
under review and must come from locales outside of the hospital's
service area. These physicians may perform these services either as
volunteers working to improve their profession, or as paid consultants. In either instance, as persons assisting the peer review process, they should be protected by the Act's immunity provisions.242
Members of county or state medical societies, medical school
faculties, specialty board certification societies, or noted experts in
the relevant field could serve as auditors and should be asked to
review systematically the relevant clinical data. Following this
chart review, the auditor should have the discretion to visit the
hospital, interview appropriate persons, and observe the clinical
practices of physicians under review. The overall purpose of these
actions is to provide the auditor with sufficient evidence to render
an impartial, objective written opinion regarding the merits of the
physician's application for appointment or reappointment, or the
need for corrective action. 243 This opinion should be presented to
the physician under review, hospital management, and board members, and should articulate the quality of care issues in a way that
informs a lay audience. Accordingly, hospital boards will not be
denied the benefit of essential medical input into the physician
evaluation process, and the reviewers will not be subject to the
more direct professional pressure physicians feel when reviewing a
fellow staff member. 2" To ensure fairness, the physician under review should be allowed to submit a written reply to the auditor's
report. The goal of the hospital's board should be to promote the
quality of patient care by improving the physician's performance, if
possible. Dismissal from the staff or denial of appointment should
be viewed as acts of last resort.
A major obstacle to the adoption of outside peer review may be
opposition from the hospital's medical staff. It may view outside
review as a way of circumventing its historic prerogative of controlling the staff's composition. Hospital physicians probably will
object strongly to any effort that may diminish this control. A systhe Quality Assurance and Utilization Review Committee is responsible for
evaluating the quality of care provided in the hospital, reviewing utilization,
and monitoring professional performances of individual practitioners.
Id. (citations omitted).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 1111 1(a)(1)(C), (D) (1988).
243. Chayet & Reardon, supra note 29, at 310.
244. A finding that a physician is clinically competent, however, may not be dispositive of an action before a board. Hospitals often make appointment, reappointment, and
disciplinary decisions that are not limited to this factor. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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tematic elimination of the staff from the peer review process may
be unworkable in the political climate of most hospitals. Therefore, the Act should allow its immunity to be used at the hospital's
election on a case-by-case basis. For example, hospitals may want
the option of using outside reviewers to take advantage of the Act's
immunity in cases that are likely to be litigated. 245 The staff, which
is usually just as averse to litigation as the hospital, if not more so,
should find outside review acceptable under these circumstances.
As outside review is used more often, the process may gain wider
acceptance and eventually replace the intrahospital peer review
model.
B.

Strengthen the Immunity

Second, to encourage the adoption of this process by hospitals,
Congress should expand the immunity of the Act. The Act should
immunize the hospital, its board and management, all informants,
and all outside reviewers who participate in this appointment, reappointment, or corrective action process from liability for all
monetary, injunctive, or declaratory relief. The Act should also
provide that this immunity can be defeated only if the aggrieved
physician alleges with factual particularity that the hospital's actions were utterly without factual basis. In other words, the hospital and its reviewers should be liable only for damages, with
equitable relief available if the outside reviewers were used merely
as a pretext or a sham to eliminate a particular physician. The
aggrieved physician, however, would have to allege specifically
why the peer review action was factually unfounded. Accordingly,
the physician should be provided with a copy of the outside consultants' report without disclosing the identity of the consultants, and
be given an opportunity to submit a response to the report before
the hospital board takes final action on the matter. The physician
also should be given a copy of the board's final decision and the
reason for it.
C. Expand Exposurefor Attorney Fees and Costs
Finally, as a further disincentive to bring suit, the Act should
make the losing party liable for all costs of the prevailing party
arising out of the action, including reasonable attorneys' fees. The
Act currently allows a substantially prevailing party to recover
245. For example, certain medical staff candidates may initiate the application process with threats of litigation if their application is not approved. These physicians would
be prime candidates for such review.
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these costs only if the claim is frivolous, unreasonable, without
foundation, or made in bad faith. 2" This provision appears to add
nothing to the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 24 7 The proposed amendment would take good or bad
intentions out of the analysis employed in awarding costs and attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. This provision would also
cause hospitals to avoid using outside consultants as a mere pretext
to discipline a competent physician.
D.

Rebuilding the Peer Review Infrastructure

Additionally, the Act should give states a reasonable period of
time within which to amend their laws to allow hospitals to bypass
the traditional peer review process in favor of using outside consultants. The sanction for failing to do so should be the loss of federal
Medicare and Medicaid dollars for hospitals in nonconforming
states. The JCAHO also should be required to delete its standards
requiring traditional peer review. To encourage this adjustment,
the Act should offer the JCAHO the choice of either: (1) allowing
the hospital to use and rely upon outside consultants without intrahospital peer review, or (2) having hospitals deemed in compliance with Medicare's conditions of participation if they are
licensed by the state, instead of accredited by the JCAHO.
E. Summary
The advantage of these proposed changes is that a system of
outside physician review would limit substantially the professional
and economic concerns of medical staff members in monitoring
quality of care. Hospital physicians would also be relieved of the
246. 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (1988). The Act provides:
In any suit brought against a defendant, to the extent that a defendant has met
the standards set forth under section 11112(a) of this title and the defendant
substantially prevails, the court shall, at the conclusion of the action, award to a
substantially prevailing party defending against any such claim the cost of the
suit attributable to such claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the
claim, or the claimant's conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith. For the purposes of
this section, a defendant shall not be considered to have substantially prevailed
when the plaintiff obtains an award for damages or permanent injunctive or
declaratory relief.
Id.
247. Rule 11 provides that complaints and other pleadings must be "well grounded in
fact and... warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and.. . not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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burden of engaging in peer review at the peril of damaging important professional relationships or incurring substantial litigation
expenses. An amended Act would also eliminate the intricate,
inefficient, and ultimately ineffective hospital bureaucracy that has
developed to implement peer review.
In addition, hospital reliance on attorneys to guide them
through the complex maze of adequate notice and fair hearing requirements, which differ from state to state, will be eliminated.
Under traditional peer review, attorneys play a substantial role in
ensuring that all of the notice and hearing requirements mandated
by federal and state law are satisfied to minimize the hospital's
legal exposure for improperly employing the peer review process.
The resources currently devoted to compliance with laws affecting
peer review would be better spent on quality of care data collection
and evaluation. The funds hospitals will save on legal fees can be
devoted to retention of reliable consultants and improvement of
quality assurance data collection and evaluation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is no proof that intrahospital physician peer review improves the quality of health care in hospitals. What little is known
about evaluating physician performance suggests that this process
may be ineffective. The apparent failure of peer review is founded
largely upon the economic dynamics of the medical profession.
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 fails to address the first and primary concern of physicians-the importance
of their relationships with other physicians. If the Act were
amended to allow hospital boards and management to retain
outside physician reviewers to provide objective analyses of the
clinical abilities of the physicians under review, the political influence from the hospital's physicians on these decisions would diminish greatly. Moreover, the protections of the Act should be
bolstered to bar all claims for relief or damages, except in cases
involving a pretextual reliance on outside review. This proposal
would remove the medical staff from the role of professional gatekeeper of the hospital and allow hospital boards and management
to focus more upon quality of care than legal issues.
Until the Act overcomes the political barriers to effective peer
review and affords some real protection against lawsuits involving
peer review decisions, its important objectives will never be realized. Much needs to be learned about how to evaluate the competence of physicians. Improving data collection and engaging
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disinterested outside reviewers to grapple with this issue will better
educate hospital boards and staff physicians about the quality of
their medical care than relying upon intrahospital peer review.

